This paper examines how trade unions shape the volatility of wages over the business cycle. I present a dynamic stochastic model of the labor market that integrates two main features: search frictions and trade unions. Because of search frictions, each job match yields an economic surplus that is shared by the bargained wage. Therefore, I can decompose the volatility of wages into two components: the volatility of the match surplus and the volatility of the worker share of the surplus. Starting from the unions' objective function, I demonstrate that, under collective wage bargaining, the worker share is endogenous and countercyclical. Consequently, when the economy is hit by a shock, the dynamics of the worker share partially counteract the dynamics of the match surplus and this mechanism delivers endogenous wage rigidity. The model thus sheds new insights into two business cycle features: the union wage premium uctuates countercyclically, and employment is more cyclically sensitive but less persistent when wages are collectively bargained.
Introduction
The role of trade unions is to protect the rights and interests of their members through representation within rms.
In so doing, trade unions negotiate with employers on behalf of workers for better wages and working conditions. Therefore, through their direct participation in the wage determination process, trade unions aect the wage level and shape its volatility. This paper integrates trade unions into a dynamic search and matching framework that species two important sources of wage volatility: the volatility of the total match surplus and the volatility of the worker share, which is formally dened as the share of the total surplus obtained by workers. I study how these two sources of wage volatility interact over the business cycle to elucidate the cyclical properties of collectively-bargained wages, labor market tightness, employment, and union wage premia.
Specically, this paper builds on Mortensen and Pissarides' (1994) high, even though union density has declined overall, 2 and because of their direct participation in wage negotiations, unions necessarily aect not only the level but also the volatility of wages. Pissarides (1986) rst integrated trade unions, in the form of a single monopoly union, into a search and matching framework, and Delacroix (2006) and Garibaldi and Violante (2005) subsequently extended his work. These authors model wage determination in the presence of trade unions and describe the negative impact of the union wage premium on employment.
However, they propose steady state analyses that do not provide insight into the specic volatility of collectively bargained wages.
I develop and simulate a model of collective wage bargaining and compare the labor market dynamics with those characterizing individual wage bargaining. In so doing, I am able to identify the role of trade unions in shaping the volatility of labor market variables. The unions' utility function increases in both wages and employment, and the labor demand embodies the trade-o faced by unions. I decompose the mechanism through which unions aects wage dynamics in three steps. First, I demonstrate that the unions' preferences regarding employment and wages, dened as the marginal rate of substitution between them, directly 1 Shimer (2005) notes that at conventional parameters values, individually Nash bargained wages are excessively volatile, depressing vacancy creation. Consequently, employment is far less volatile in the model than in the data. Wage rigidity has been explored as a way to improve the performance of the model.
2 For a recent study on wage bargaining institutions in most European countries, the U.S., and Japan, see Du Caju, Gautier, Momferatou, and Ward-Warmedinger (2008) . Among other results, they provide evidence on collective bargaining coverage and establish that this rate exceeds 80% in most western European countries.
translate into the worker share of the surplus, i.e., the fraction of the total match surplus obtained by the workers. Indeed, when unions favor employment, they lower the worker share to boost the rms' surplus and vacancy postings.
Conversely, when unions favor wages, they demand a high worker share.
Second, I show that the unions' preferences and therefore the labor share uctuate endogenously. When the economy is hit by an adverse productivity shock, given the higher reactivity of wages compared with employment, the unions' rst concern is to avoid a large decrease in the wage rate. Therefore, on impact, unions prioritize wages over employment and exert upward pressure on the worker share. In subsequent periods, as the adverse shock propagates into the economy and as unemployment increases, unions become more employmentoriented, diminishing the worker share. This second nding is consistent with empirical evidence suggesting that the unions' power to raise wages is reduced when unemployment is high. 3 The unions' behavior is therefore entirely explained by changes in the relative weights given to wages and employment over the business cycle, and because the cyclical properties of the unions' preferences directly determine the cyclical properties of the worker share, the worker share is countercyclical and features little persistence.
Third, the wage equation indicates that wages increase with both the total match surplus and the labor share. Under collective wage bargaining, the countercyclical uctuations in the labor share dampen the procyclical uctuations of wages, and this mechanism endogenously generates wage rigidity.
Furthermore, the low persistence in the worker share dynamics, which is explained by the change in the union's preferences over the business cycle, translates into high persistence in the wage dynamics. I also investigate the cyclical properties of the union wage premium. Because the uctuations in the labor share represent an additional source of wage volatility for collectively bargained wages only, I nd that the union wage premium widens after an adverse shock. The model therefore provides a theoretical rationale for the countercyclicality of the union wage premium that has been documented by several empirical studies. For example, in their book entitled What do unions do?, Freeman and Medo (1984) show that unions behave more aggressively in poor economic times. Their underlying argument diers slightly from the present argument, as they explain that the countercyclicality of the union wage premium observed during the depression of the 1920s and 1930s is mainly driven by the greater capacity of unionized workers to ght employers' eort to reduce 3 Using time series data for the Swedish construction sector, Aronsson, Löfgren, and Wikström (1993) test two models of wage determination: one in which the bargaining power of the union is constant over time and another one in which the bargaining power develops with unemployment and labor market characteristics. They nd evidence that unemployment tends to decrease the bargaining power of the union. Campbell (1997) empirically conrms this result. Using U.S. data, he nds that union wages are more sensitive than nonunion wages to the unemployment rate. See also Calmfors, Booth, Burda, Checchi, Naylor, and Visser (2001) , Part I, chapter 2.4, for a literature review on the negative relation between unemployment and union membership, which is based on the argument that in times of high and rising unemployment, unions are less able to press demands and obtain advantages for members.
wages when market conditions are unfavorable. Based on an empirical study of the union wage premium in the U.S. over the 1973 -2002 period, Blanchower and Bryson (2004 also nd that the union wage premium widens during recessions.
Therefore, in this paper, I provide a micro-foundation of the rigidity of collectively-bargained wages. This rigidity, in turn, amplies the volatility of employment and labor market tightness over the business cycle. Using a calibration that matches the empirical regularities of the U.S., I show that labor market tightness is twice as volatile in a collective bargaining model than in an individual bargaining model. Therefore, accounting for collective wage bargaining greatly increases the performance of the search and matching model and partially addresses Shimer's (2005) critique that basic search and matching models are unable to capture the strong procyclicality of labor market tightness.
This improvement is expected to be more substantial in European countries, where the union coverage often exceeds 80%, than in the U.S., where the union coverage is currently approximately 10 − 15%.
This paper also connects labor market volatility to the degree of coordination in collective wage bargaining. Indeed, the model accommodates a wage negotiation process that takes place at both the rm level and the economy level. Under collective wage-bargaining at the rm level, when a multitude of unions bargain with a continuum of rms, each union is too small to inuence the market and, in particular, the vacancy lling rate. On the opposite, when wages are collectively bargained at the economy level, between a representative rm and a representative union, the representative union internalizes the positive wage eect on the vacancy-lling rate and is therefore more favorable towards pushing for higher wages. The countercyclicality of the worker share is dampened and this mechanism therefore suggests that wage rigidity decreases with the degree of centralization in collective wage bargaining.
Finally, this paper also addresses a large literature on the insider-outsider theory of wages and unemployment. 4 This approach places market power into the hands of employed workers (insiders). In the present setting, employed workers under collective bargaining derive their market power from both the presence of search frictions and union representation. If unions were to be run by insiders only, the unions' utility would be a sole function of wages, and unions would raise wages to their maximum, similarly to an individual wage bargaining.
As soon as unions put some weight on outsiders, employment enters the unions' utility function which brings unions to trade between wages and employment and to curb their wage demands. When the labor market is tight, the proportion of insiders to outsiders in unions is high, and insiders gain ability to impose their interests to the detriment of outsiders who suer from a low job nding rate. The opposite occurs when the labor market is slack. Moreover, the model predicts that, when allowing unions to factor in the negative consequences of their wage demands on future employment opportunities and future worker surpluses, unions make more aggressive wage demands and the uctuations in 4 See for example Lindbeck and Snower (1986) , Lindbeck and Snower (1989) and Blanchard and Summers (1986) .
the worker share are dampened.
The present model provides a convenient framework for analyzing the role of unions in shaping the volatility of wages and employment. In this sense, my paper is related to a small literature that studies the business cycle in settings that depart from perfect competition in the labor market. Mattesini and Rossi (2009) and Faia and Rossi (2013) analyze optimal monetary policy rules in a unionized or dual labor market economy, whereas Zanetti (2007) develops a DSGE model with the addition of a unionized labor market to analyze the macroeconomic responses to demand and supply shocks. In these three papers, unions dampen wage dynamics because union wages are assumed to depend on either exogenous union reservation wages or past wages, two assumptions that creates ad hoc wage rigidity. 5 These assumptions and features are unsatisfactory if one wishes to identify the sources of union wage rigidity.
Moreover, none of these studies integrates trade unions into a search and matching framework, which is yet a natural way of modeling the objective function for unions, from which the union wage and the endogenous worker share is derived, and allows for a clear comparison between individual and collective wage bargaining. Furthermore, the search and matching framework enables me to unveil a new mechanism of wage rigidity for collectively bargained wages and to give a novel perspective on the behavior of trade unions over the business cycle and on the cyclical properties of employment and labor market tightness. Similar to this paper, Alvarez and Shimer (2014) and Krusell and Rudanko (2012) introduce unions into a search model but their focus diers. Alvarez and Shimer (2014) analyze how unions, by imposing a minimum wage, aect both unemployment and the wage distribution. Krusell and Rudanko (2012) integrate monopoly unions into a search and matching framework to document the endogenous rigidity of wages that arises when wages are collectively bargained. Their analysis focuses on the welfare eect of a monopoly union, while I mainly study how trade unions aect the volatility of the labor market, disentangling the dierent channels through which collective bargaining aects the cyclical properties of wages, labor market tightness and employment. Moreover, monopoly unions represent a special case of my analysis, as I allow the union to bargain with rms regarding wages. This setting enables me to examine how a change in the union's bargaining process modies labor market volatilities.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the collective wage bargaining and the equilibrium equations. I also provide a comparison of the wage formation and hiring processes with a standard individual Nash bargaining setting. Section 3 focuses on the model's properties: the countercyclical worker share that yields wage rigidity, and the countercyclical union wage premium. Section 4 quantitatively analyzes the dynamic behavior of the model for disturbances (productivity shocks). Section 5 concludes.
5 In Mattesini and Rossi (2009) , union wages are totally acyclical due to the additional assumption of a Stone-Geary utility function of the union. occurs with a level of employment n t , and salaries w t and unemployment benets b are paid. In this framework, rms react to productivity shocks by adjusting vacancies and newly employed workers start producing within the hiring period. 6 This assumption parallels the labor market segmentation into a unionized primary sector and a secondary competitive sector presented by MacDonald and Solow (1985) . Moreover, in a model with homogenous workers, the assumption of labor market segmentation is in line with the sluggishness of the excess coverage rate (Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) ), which indicates that the division of workers into the union and non-union labor markets can be considered xed in the short-run.
matching frameworks (see Pissarides (1986) , Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) , and Delacroix (2006)).
Stocks and Flows
The labor force is homogeneous and normalized to one. The end-of-period employment n t evolves according to the following dynamics:
whereas the number of unemployed workers at the beginning of period t evolves as:
Vacancy Posting Decision under Collective Bargaining
Firms are assumed to be suciently large to ensure that by the law of large numbers, the fraction of vacancies lled in each rm is equal to the vacancy lling rate: q t (θ t ) = mt vt
represents the labor market tightness.
Aggregate productivity, denoted by z t , follows an AR(1) process. Given that rms are identical, I focus on a representative rm whose output is given by y t = z t n t . The rms' costs consist of the wage and the vacancy posting cost (c per vacancy).
The number of posted vacancies maximizes the prot value function:
where β is the discount factor. The rst-order condition is given by:
Applying the envelope condition to Equation 3 leads to:
Plugging Equation (4) into Equation (3), I obtain the job creation equation:
Because the job creation curve obtained under individual wage bargaining is a standard result in the search and matching literature, I succinctly derive it in 7 Note that each individual rm and worker are too small to inuence the market, so when they meet, they take the rest of the market as given. At the beginning of each period, unions and rms bargain over the wage.
Subsequently, the rms unilaterally decide the number of vacancies to post based on the wage that has been previously negotiated. This right-to-manage model, which is in line with Nickell (1982) and Nickell and Andrews (1983) , nests the special case of monopoly unions but allows for a more general assessment of how the unions' bargaining power aects wage volatility. 8 , 9 Note that, in order to keep as simple a theoretical framework as possible, I do not introduce the possibility of overlapping contracts and leave the investigation of this issue open for future research.
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The Nash-bargained wage maximizes the product of the net gain of agreement for both parties.
Collective Nash-Bargaining
Net gain of agreement for unions. W t and U t denote the present values of being employed and being unemployed at the end of period t, respectively:
where p t = mt ut is the job nding rate.
Unions are concerned with the welfare of their members, who are either employed or unemployed.
At the time of bargaining, 1 − u t workers are employed, and all these workers will reach the payo W t with certainty at the 8 See Zanetti (2011), Mattesini and Rossi (2009), and Faia and Rossi (2013) for models with monopoly unions.
9 Right-to-manage bargained wages are not Pareto ecient. Ecient contracts can be obtained if rms and unions were to bargain simultaneously over wages and employment, as shown by Leontief (1946) . However, as argued by Calmfors and Horn (1986) and Oswald (1993) , negotiations generally do not include employment explicitly.
10 A plausible setting would be to have a Calvo-type staggered wage negotiation and trade unions that bargain over the duration of the wage contracts. Potentially, depending on the unions' utility function, such a framework could also generate endogenous wage rigidity. end of the period; by contrast, u t workers are unemployed, and a fraction p t of these workers will form a match and obtain the associated payo W t , with the remaining 1 − p t reaching the level of utility U t . The unions' utility Ω t is assumed to be the sum of the utility levels of their members:
Because all workers would be unemployed if the wage negotiation fails, the workers' fall back utility is U t . Hence, the unions' net value of agreement is n t (W t − U t ).
11 Under the assumptions that workers and rms are homogenous, the value of employment for the marginal worker is identical among workers.
Moreover, under constant returns to scale in the production function, the wage rate is independent of the employment level, and the welfare values W t and U t represent the employment and unemployment values, respectively, of both the marginal and average worker. Therefore, W t − U t can be interpreted as the average worker's surplus and n t (W t − U t ) as the total surplus of the workers.
This utilitarian specication, in line with MacDonald and Solow (1981) and Oswald (1982) , is common in the trade union literature (see Calmfors (1982) , Sampson (1983) , Kidd and Oswald (1987) , and Pissarides (1986) , among others).
First, this specication allows for an immediate comparison of the workers' objectives across wage bargaining processes. Workers who individually bargain over their wage seek to maximize their own surplus W t − U t without considering how the bargain aects employment. In comparison, when negotiating with rms, unions aim at maximizing the sum of the workers' surpluses, n t (W t − U t ).
Both workers and unions foresee that their demands aect the rms' hiring decision. However, the specic feature of collective bargaining is that when negotiating wages, unions internalize the employer response to the wage bargain, as they seek to maximize the individual surplus of a match and the proportion of workers receiving this surplus. Second, the search and matching framework provides a natural way to model the workers' fall back utility U t , which is not xed over time but uctuates with the expected evolution of market tightness. Third, in contrast with Stone-Geary utility functions, the unions' objective is directly derived from the union members' preferences. Therefore, the unions' utility specication, as described by Equation (8), allows for political considerations. Indeed, I will show that employment and wages do not have xed weights in the unions' utility function and that, consequently, the relative importance that unions assign to these two issues endogenously uctuates over the business cycle.
Net gain of agreement for rms. If the collective bargaining process is successful and if a wage agreement is reached, each rm obtains an end-ofperiod prot F t , which includes the vacancy lling costs that are not sunk 11 Given that the surplus of unemployed workers is equal to zero, the same net value of agreement is obtained if the union is assumed to be concerned only with the welfare of the workers who are employed at the end of the period.
at the time of the bargaining.
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Moreover, because rms would not nd any nonunion workers to ll vacancies if the bargaining fails, the rms' fall back payo is zero. Therefore, the net gain of agreement for the rms is equal to F t . As I show in Appendix B, the rms' prot can be written as a function of J t , which denotes the rms' ex-post employment value of both the marginal and the average match, i.e., once the vacancy lling costs have been sunk:
Wage Equation under Firm-Level Wage Negotiation
I rst derive the wage equation obtained when wages are collectively negotiated at each rm level. Equation (8) shows that the unions' utility depends on both wages and employment. High wages increase the individual worker's surplus, but because the job creation curve is downward sloping, high wages also reduce the rms' incentive to post vacancies and therefore lower employment: Ω t = Ω t (w t , n t (w t )) with Ω w > 0, Ω n > 0, and n w < 0. The rms' labor demand function therefore embodies the trade-o faced by unions and constrains the unions' maximization problem. 13 Moreover, when wages are negotiated at the rm-level, unions do not internalize the eect of wages on the vacancy-lling rate, as each union is too small to inuence the market. Therefore, unions factor in the negative impact of wages on vacancies, but discard the wage eect on the vacancy-lling rate.
where η C is the union's bargaining power. 14 In Table 1 , I report two results: i) the equilibrium condition for the worker share of the total surplus,η t , that results from the rst-order condition; and ii) the wage curve that derives from this equilibrium condition (see Appendices 12 For this reason, the vacancy lling costs must be taken into account in the expected prot. Hence, the dierences in the wage equations across wage-setting processes stem from both the dierence in the level at which the wage bargaining occurs (individualized bargaining vs. collective bargaining) and the dierence in timing (ex-ante wage bargaining in the union model vs. ex-post wage bargaining in the non-union model).
13 This trade-o would disappear if the vacancy posting decision was made before the wage bargaining, and both wage-setting processes would lead to the same equilibrium. Indeed, if vacancies were posted ex-ante, the hiring decision would be based on the expected, or promised, wage level. Yet, the union cannot credibly announce that it will moderate the wage rate to promote hiring. Indeed, once the vacancies have been posted, the union would deviate from its announcement and push the wage to the highest possible level.
14 For an empirical test of this maximization problem, see Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981) .
C.1 and C.3). Moreover, to compare the two wage-setting processes, I indicate the optimal worker share and the wage curve obtained under individual wage bargaining (see Appendices A.2 and A.2).
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When wages are individually bargained, the optimality condition states that the worker share of the total surplus equals the workers' bargaining power. In contrast, when wages are collectively bargained, the optimal worker share,η t , is equal to the unions' bargaining power, η, multiplied by a second term that is endogenous and smaller than one. Regarding the wage curve, two comments are in order. First, the structure of the wage curve is identical across wage-setting processes, as both bargaining sets are bounded by the same wage levels: z t + E t β(1−λ)cθ t+1 and b. Indeed, the third term on the right side of Equation (10), Θ t , which indicates how the expected evolution of the worker share aects the workers' wage, becomes negligible as the model's persistence increases. Second, because the worker share,η t , is endogenous under collective wage bargaining, the sharing rule does not allocate a constant proportion of the bargaining set to the worker and the rm. Consequently, the uctuations in the wage rate stem from two distinct sources: the uctuations of the total surplus and the uctuations of the worker share. This crucial result is the focus of Section 3.1.
Wage Equation with Economy-Wide Wage Negotiation
When wage bargaining is co-ordinated through economy-wide agreements, the collective bargain that takes place between an employer association and one recognized union translates in our framework into a bargaining process between a representative rm and a representative union. Because of the broad impact of the negotiated wage, the representative union internalizes the wage eect on both vacancy posting and the vacancy-lling rate. As a result, employment is less sensitive to wage changes, as the negative wage eect on vacancies is partially oset by the positive wage eect on the vacancy-lling rate.
The worker share of the total surplus and the wage curve are shown on Table   1 .
16 Equation (14) shows that the worker shareη t is less cyclical than in the case of rm-level collective bargaining. Section 4.2.2 will compare the impulse responses to productivity shocks for these two levels of wage bargaining.
3 The Model's Properties 16 See Appendices C.3 and C.2 for the derivations. Individual wage bargaining
Collective wage bargaining -Firm-level bargaining
where
Collective wage bargaining -Economy-wide bargaining
Note: η C and η I denote the union's bargaining power (under collective wage bargaining) and the workers' bargaining power (under individual wage bargaining), respectively.
for rm-level and economy-wide wage negotiations, I can use either of the two sets on results to illustrate the mechanisms at play, and this section focuses on economy-wide wage negotiation. I will disentangle the two levels of wage negotiation in Section 4 in which I carry out a quantitative assessment of the model.
Countercyclical Worker Share
To better comprehend the properties of the worker share, I express Equation (14) as a function of the beginning-of-period unemployment level, u t , and the out-of-unemployment probability, p t . For
where the following properties hold (see Appendix C.4):
The worker share is decreasing in the job-nding rate. Indeed, when the labor market becomes tighter and unemployed workers face a higher probability of nding a job, unions have a higher incentive to foster employment. Unions are therefore willing to hold back wages by lowering the worker share to encourage rms to post vacancies. Moreover, as unions are prone to prioritizing employment when unemployment is high, the worker share is also decreasing in the beginning-of-period unemployment level, a nding that is consistent with the existing empirical literature. 17 On impact, given that the beginning-of-period unemployment level is predetermined, a productivity shock aects the worker share solely through its eect on the job-nding rate. Consequently, the worker share is countercyclical.
Examining the unions' maximization problem provides a deeper understanding of the countercyclical property of the worker share. The unions' utility function, Equation (8), is increasing in both wages and employment, and the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between them indicates the relative value that unions assign to wages and employment. When the MRS of wages for employment is high (low), unions are considered wage (employment) oriented.
Through its impact on wages and employment, a productivity shock alters the unions' MRS, and therefore, the trade-o unions make between wages and employment varies over the business cycle. The extent to which the MRS increases depends on the relative increase in wages compared with the increase in employment. A larger increase in wages compared to the increase in employment is associated with a lower marginal utility of wages and a decrease in the MRS.
In this model, the wage rate reacts relatively more than the employment level, a result that is common in the search and matching literature. Indeed, the vacancy posting decision is motivated by the dierence between the level of productivity and the wage rate, and the reaction of employment is smoother than that of the wage rate. 18 Consequently, we obtain:
under standard calibration. See Appendix C.5 for the full derivation.
After the shock, the decrease in the MRS means that an additional increase in the employment level provides a higher level of utility than that in the previous period, relative to an additional increase in the wage rate.
Therefore, the unions' preferences shift toward employment. This shift in preferences explains why unions are willing to lower the worker share to stimulate employment. Indeed, if the worker share were xed, the wage rate would increase beyond its optimal level and would hinder vacancy postings.
Starting from the rst period after the productivity shock, an additional (and opposite) mechanism is at play. A productivity shock occurring in period t 17 See Aronsson, Löfgren, and Wikström (1993), Campbell (1997) , and Calmfors, Booth, Burda, Checchi, Naylor, and Visser (2001) .
18 This mechanism embodies Shimer's critique. See Shimer (2005) .
aects the composition of unions, i.e., the proportion of (un)employed workers, from period t + 1 onward. As stated in Equation (15), the worker share is negatively correlated with the beginning-of-period unemployment level, and this negative correlation opens a second channel through which shocks aect wage bargaining. Indeed, the heterogeneity of the unions' members introduces political considerations and reects the internal conict within the unions. As the positive shock propagates into the economy and lowers the proportion of unemployed workers, unions become more willing to exert upward pressure on wages by seizing a large portion of the total surplus.
Consequently, the unions' preferences and the consequent worker share uctuate along the business cycle in the following manner. When a positive productivity shock occurs, unions become, on impact, more employment oriented. This shift in preferences translates into a decrease in the worker share that endogenously creates wage rigidity. In the periods that follow, as employment increases and as the wage rate returns to its steady state value, the marginal utility of employment decreases and the marginal utility of the wage rate increases, leading to a decrease of the MRS of employment for wages.
Unions therefore give higher importance to wages relative to employment as the shock propagates in the economy, entailing a rapid return of the worker share to its steady state level, a curtailment of the persistence of wages, and a raise in the persistence of employment.
Wage Rigidity
The wage curves, Equation (13), demonstrates that the wage rate is driven by two variables: the procyclical total match surplus and the countercyclical worker share. The uctuation of the worker share, which is constant under individual wage bargaining, is at the core of the wage rigidity mechanism under collective bargaining. Indeed, the dynamics of the worker share partially counteracts the dynamics of the total surplus and, consequently, dampens the wage uctuations.
My comments are twofold. Shimer (2010) , the wage is a weighted average of the past wage level and a current equilibrium wage level. 19 In the present paper, the wage rate uctuates with the current productivity level, and it is not an explicit function of its past value, i.e., it is not a state variable.
Countercyclical Union Wage Premium
The cyclical properties of the union wage premium directly result from the relative rigidity of collectively bargained wages. Indeed, because individually bargained wages are more cyclical than collectively bargained wages, the model predicts that the union wage premium increases during downturns and dwindles during upturns.
Quantitative Assessment of the Model
In this section, I investigate the quantitative properties of the model by studying the impulse responses of the labor market to a positive productivity shock. To do so, I consider a log-linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions as stated in Appendix C.6.
Calibration
The calibration of the model is described in Table 2 The productivity variable is then logged and de-trended by using an HP lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 to isolate the cyclical component of the series. The log productivity level z t is assumed to follow an AR(1) process: log(z t ) = ρ log(z t−1 ) + t where ∼ N (0, σ 2 ). target the degree of labor market tightness θ to 0.5, which is consistent with the estimate of 0.539 obtained by Hall (2005) . I set the probability that each match ceases, λ, to 0.1/3. This value is within the broadly accepted range of 8% − 10% proposed by Hall (2005) and is similar to Shimer's (2005) exit probability estimate of 0.1/3 for the U.S.. In the baseline model, the separation rates are identical across wage-setting processes; however, I check the robustness of the results by using an alternative calibration for λ in the collective wage bargaining model (Section 4.2.3).
Regarding the matching function, two parameters must be discussed. First, the weight on unemployment σ u , which represents both the elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment and the elasticity of the vacancy lling rate with respect to the labor market tightness, is set equal to 0.5. This value is consistent with the range [0.5 − 0.7] proposed by Burda and Wyplosz (1994) , based on estimations of the matching function for certain western European countries. The steady state of the model is shown in Table 3 . Because unions have higher bargaining power than individual workers, the steady state features a small but positive union wage premium. Because the rms' value of a lled vacancy decreases as the wage rate increases, vacancy postings are moderate in the collective wage bargaining model, rendering the labor market more slack and increasing both the unemployment rate and the unemployment duration. and abstract from factors that aect the long-run evolution of the labor market, such as changes in the education system or in demographics. Therefore, all variables are logged and de-trended by using an HP lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. equilibrium condition on the worker share:
Moments
and the hat operator denotes log-deviation from the steady state. Because γ is increasing in η C , the change in the worker share resulting from a change in the labor market tightness increases as the unions' bargaining power increases. Indeed, for high values of the unions' bargaining power, wages would be more volatile if the worker share were xed. Therefore, a positive shock encourages unions to be even more employment-oriented and to substantially decrease the worker share. The positive shock thus leads to a strong impulse in vacancy creation and to large volatility in the labor market.
Consequently, the worker share eect increases with the unions' bargaining power.
Second, because unions have stronger bargaining power than individual workers, the labor market is more volatile when wages are collectively bargained.
As argued by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) , the size of the percentage change in the rms' surplus in response to a shock generates the rms' incentive to post vacancies. Percentage changes are negatively correlated with the steady-state value of the rms' surplus. Therefore, through its eect on wages, a strong unions' bargaining power reduces the rms' surplus. Consequently, stronger union bargaining power is associated with larger percentage changes in the rms' surplus and a greater incentive for the rms to post vacancies. This mechanism builds on the dierence in steady states that results from the dierence in bargaining power between unions and workers. Hence, I refer to this mechanism as the steady-state eect of unions. By denition, I expect the steady-state eect of unions to increase with the unions' bargaining power. In the next section, the analysis of the impulse-response functions will enable me to quantitatively disentangle the worker share eect from the steady-state eect of unions on the labor market volatility. Table 6 shows that the relationship between wage volatility and the unions' bargaining power is not linear. Such nonlinearity arises because, although wages are rigid on impact, they are also more persistent, as discussed in Section 3.1.
The total eect on wage volatility depends on the relative strength of these two opposite forces. Here, the analysis of the impulse responses that will be conducted in the next section will allow me to observe the rigidity of wages on impact and their persistence over time.
Regarding the autocorrelations, I observe that employment, vacancies, and market tightness are less persistent for higher values of the unions' bargaining power but that the autocorrelation measures do not match the observed statistics.
Finally, regarding the empirical correlations, the negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies, i.e., the Beveridge curve, appears to be too strong in the individual bargaining model relative to the observed statistics.
This correlation decreases, in absolute terms, in the collective bargaining model, suggesting that including collective bargaining in the analysis improves the t of the model. The risk, however, is that the correlation will be undervalued if the weight on collective bargaining, e.g., the union coverage, is too large or if the unions' bargaining power is too high. Finally, the correlations between wages and the other labor market variables in the case of union monopoly indicate that considering collective wage bargaining brings the simulated moments closer to the data. In particular, wages are less correlated with the unemployment rate, market tightness, and labor productivity when wages are collectively bargaining than when wages are individually bargained. However, this result should be considered with caution because the relationship between the correlation values and the unions' bargaining power is not linear.
Impulse Responses to Productivity
Economy-wide wage negotiation. As explained in the previous section, the dierence in labor market dynamics across the models is explained by both the This eect derives from the countercyclical worker share that characterizes collective wage bargaining. On impact, unions lower the worker share and, through this channel, slightly decreases the volatility of wages. Indeed, the dashed line lies below the dotted line, which indicates that collective wages are more rigid on impact. Because wages are less reactive to the shock, rms gain an extra surplus and react by posting more vacancies. Consequently, the reaction of labor market tightness and employment is stronger. As the shock propagates in the economy and as employment increases, more employed workers call for high-level wages, which results in a change in the unions' preferences. As unions become more wage-oriented, they progressively engage into a more aggressive wage policy by boosting the worker share, which slows down the wage reversion toward its steady-state level. Moreover, because the worker share eect increases the persistence of wages, the rms' surplus, the vacancies, and the employment rate feature less persistence. to inuence the hiring rate, they abstract from the positive eect that wages have on the vacancy lling rate and overestimate the negative wage eect on employment. As a result, they are more reluctant to push for higher wages and the countercyclicality of the worker share is strengthened. Consequently, wages are more rigid and employment uctuations are larger. This result therefore suggests that wage rigidity depends negatively on the degree of centralization of collective bargaining.
Robustness
The value of the unions' bargaining power. Therefore, this result conrms the theoretical prediction (Section 4.2.1) that the worker share eect increases with the unions' bargaining power.
The value of λ. The empirical literature presents evidence that the separation rate is lower in highly unionized sectors.
24
To be in line with this strand of 24 For example, Freeman (1980) shows that in the U.S., tenure is greater for workers who are covered by union contracts and that the probability of their match ceasing is lower. Knight and Latreille (2000) and Antcli and Saundry (2009) As shown in Figure 4 , the worker share eect is not substantially modied by the alternative calibration. The decrease in the separation rate dampens the volatility of the worker share; however the overall eect on the wage and employment dynamics is small. Furthermore, the alternative calibration modies the steady state eect. When the exit rate is low, rms benet from a larger surplus in the steady state, and a shock therefore leads to smaller percentage changes in the rms' surplus. Consequently, the rms' incentive to post vacancies is lower, which explains the moderate increase in employment. 
where ψ t = β(1 − λ)
increases the unions' marginal utility of wages and lowers the countercyclicality of the worker share. The impulse responses presented in Figure 5 conrm that, when unions take into account the wage eect on the future surplus of workers, the worker share is more rigid, wages are more cyclical, and employment's uctuations are dampened.
Concluding Remarks
By modeling collective wage bargaining in a search and matching framework, For simplicity reason, I assume constant returns to scale in the production function so that the intra-rm bargaining element vanishes. 25 As a result, the prot's maximization is not constrained by the wage equation w t = w t (n t ) and the number of posted vacancies results from the following prot maximization process:
which is identical to the case of collective wage bargaining. Therefore, under both wage-setting processes, the job creation curve is described by Equation (5).
A.2 Wage Negotiation under Individual Bargaining
Once the match is formed, the individual wage bargaining process takes place between the rm and the worker. The Nash-bargained wage maximizes the product of the net gains of agreement for both parties:
where η I ∈ [0, 1] is the workers' bargaining power.
The rst-order condition states that the worker share of the total surplus is equal to the workers' bargaining power:
By rearranging this rst-order condition and using the expression of the values J t , W t and U t , I obtain the equilibrium wage equation:
The bargaining set is delimited by two threat points and contains an innity of equilibrium wage rates. The optimal sharing rule allocates a constant share of the bargaining set to the worker and the rm.
25 See Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) .
B Prot of the Firms and Marginal Value of Employment
The rms' prot satises the following Bellman equation:
The Bellman equation of the rms' marginal value of employment is:
Therefore:
Using the law of motion of employment, n t+1 = (1 − λ)n t + q t+1 v t+1 , I obtain:
, I get: 
Plugging the job creation curve, Equation (5), and the Bellman equation for the rms' ex-post employment value of marginal match, J t , into Equation (17), we obtain F t = (1 − λ)n t−1 J t . Using this equation, we obtain the following
The law of motion of employment is n t = 1 − u t + q t v t . In case of rm-level negotiation, unions are too small to inuence the market, therefore, using (5),
we obtain:
Using this derivative, the F.O.C. can be rewritten as:
Rearranging leads to:
which is equivalent to Equation (9).
C. 
The law of motion of employment is n t = 1 − u t + q t v t . In case of economywide wage negotiation, unions internalize the wage eect on the vacancy lling rate. Therefore, using (5), we obtain:
which is equivalent to Equation (12).
C.3 Wage Curve under Collective Wage Bargaining
The functional form of the wage curve is independent of the level of wage bargaining (rm level or economy-wide).
Plugging the workers' value functions of employment and unemployment, Equations (6) and (7), into each other, I obtain:
Using the equilibrium condition (9), we can rewrite this equation as:
Plugging the value of rms' value function of employment into this equation, I get:
whereη t is dened by Equation (14).
This is equivalent to Equation (13). A similar method can be applied to obtain Equations (11) and (10).
C.4 Cyclical Properties of the Worker Share
The derivative of the worker share with respect to the job nding rate is:
The derivative of the worker share with respect to the beginning-of-period stock of unemployed workers is:
Marginal Rate of Substitution of Wage for Employ- 
C.6 Linearization
In order to analyze the channels through which the productivity shock aects the labor market, I consider a log-linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions (Equations (5), (13) and (15)), of the laws of motion of employment and unemployment, and of the equations dening matches, vacancy lling rate, job nding rate, and labor market tightness. The hat operator denotes logdeviation from the steady state.
• (End-of-period) employment dynamics:
• (Beginning-of-period) unemployment dynamics: 
Plugging the job creation curve, Equation (5) and the Bellman equation for the rms' ex-post employment value of marginal match, J t , into Equation (17), one obtains F t = (1 − λ)n t−1 J t . Using this equation, we obtain the following F.O.C. of the maximization program:
(1−λ)n t−1 J t +(1−η C )(1−λ)n t−1 ∂J t ∂w t [n t (W t −U t )] = 0
Using the law of motion of employment and the job creation curve, Equation (5), we obtain:
In this extension, unions internalize how a change in wages in time t will aect the job nding rate in time t + 1 and, through this channel, how it will aect the worker surplus in t + 1. Therefore:
∂W t ∂w t = 1 + ψ t where ψ t = β(1 − λ)
Using these derivatives, the F.O.C. of the maximization program is:
−η C m t σ u J t (W t − U t )J t + η C n t (1 + ψ t )J t = (1 − η C )n t (W t − U t )
which is equivalent to Equation (16). Note: Percentage deviation from the steady state following a positive productivity shock of one standard deviation. Workers, and therefore unions, now take into account that high wages, by lowering the future probability for unemployed workers to nd jobs, increase the future surplus of employed workers.
